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Abstract
Crowdfunding has recently become available for entrepreneurs. Most academic studies analyse data
from rewards-based (pre-selling) campaigns. In contrast, in this paper we analyse 636 campaigns,
encompassing 17,188 investors and 64,831 investments between 2012 and 2015, from one of the
leading European equity crowdfunding platforms. We provide descriptive statistics and carry out
cross-campaign regression analysis. The descriptive statistics address its size, growth and geographic
distributions in the UK. The regressions analyse which factors are associated with the probability of a
successful campaign. We find some similarities and some interesting dissimilarities in both
descriptives and regression results compared to research on rewards-based crowdfunding.
Practically, the data show that equity crowdfunding will likely pose great challenges to VC and
business angel financiers in the near future. We discuss some research challenges and opportunities
with these kind of data.
Keywords: equity crowdfunding, U.K., campaign success.
1 We are grateful to Carlos Silva, Duarte Henriques and especially Jeff Lynn from SEEDRS for their support and
patience. We are also grateful to Ella Halmari from Beauhurst for providing us with their latest research.
1. Introduction
In recent years crowdfunding has emerged as a viable and popular alternative channel for
entrepreneurs to fund their early stage businesses. The consultancy Massolution recently reported
that funds raised via global crowdfunding expanded by 167 percent in 2014 to reach $16.2 billion, up
from $6.1 billion in 2013 (Massolution, 2015). Massolution predicts that the industry is set to raise
$34.4 billion in 2015. A number of high profile campaigns and an increasing appetite to “cut out the
middleman” mean crowdfunding is likely to remain an important part of early stage finance for some
years to come.
Broadly speaking crowdfunding can be divided into four main categories: donations, rewards-based
(also called pre-selling), lending, and equity crowdfunding. Rewards-based campaigns have proved
extremely popular among entrepreneurs, and have grown in volume and number by an amazing
524% annually since 2009 according to The World Bank (2013). The focus of this paper in contrast is
equity crowdfunding. Here, the crowd, typically via an online platform, take an equity stake in the
business in much the same way VC funding works. Equity crowdfunding might be considered, a
priori, to have a more difficult time catching on because in the past, contracts associated with equity
funding have been considerably more complicated than other types of funding; the due diligence
process is often extensive; and the levels of associated investments have been so high that there is a
strong preference for funders to intimately know the entrepreneur and her business (Gompers, P.
(1995), Cumming et al. (2010)). None of these characteristics seem at first blush to make equity
investment amenable to online investing by the crowd. Reflecting these difficulties, equity
crowdfunding was not permitted in the United States in 2013, and was relatively rare worldwide,
making up less than 5% of all crowdfunding investment at that time (Massolution, 2013).
Nevertheless, data from Beauhurst, a leading consultancy on early stage investments in the UK,
show that around 21% of all early stage investment and as much as 35.5% of all seed-stage
investment deals in the UK went through equity crowdfunding sites in 2015 (Beauhurst 2015). These
data reflect a rapid recent growth and equity crowdfunding is now providing a challenge to existing
Angel networks and even some VCs.
The UK is the fastest growing country for equity crowdfunding campaigns in the world, both for the
number and size of campaigns. This is because the UK has, since the end of 2011, had in place clear
regulations to define the rules for equity crowdfunding. Investors of start-ups in the U.K. also benefit
from a very generous tax incentive via the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme, SEIS, and the
Enterprise Investment Scheme, EIS. Both schemes are designed to help small UK-based companies
raise finance by offering tax relief on new shares in those companies. The EIS is aimed at wealthier
investors who receive 30% tax relief but whose investments cannot be sold or transferred for a
minimum lock-in period of three years. The SEIS is more generous and provides tax relief of up to
50% on investments of up to £100,000, and capital gains tax exemption. The maximum investment
that can be raised by a company under this scheme is limited to £150,000. (See
https://www.gov.uk/topic/business-tax/investment-schemes for more details).
For all these reasons recent experience in the UK provides us with a unique opportunity to explore
the properties of equity crowdfunding. Since clear regulation has been in place for 4 years in the
U.K., while the detailed regulation associated with the U.S. J.O.B.S. Act was only recently settled (Fall
2015), one may use data from the U.K. to make some preliminary forecasts about what will likely
happen in the U.S. in the near future.
In this paper we study a unique dataset kindly shared with us by SEEDRS, one of the leading UK
equity crowdfunding platforms. SEEDRS was founded in 2012 by Jeff Lynn and Carlos Silva. It is based
in London and Lisbon. In 2012 SEEDRS became the first equity crowdfunding platform to be accepted
as a member of the UK Business Angels Association. More recently SEEDRS has announced their
expansion to the US market via the acquisition of Junction Investments in California. SEEDRS
business model is based on taking a one-off fee of up to 7.5% from successfully funded businesses.
In addition, SEEDRS takes a success fee from investors equal to 7.5% of the profits made as a result
of their investment.
SEEDRS platform allows the companies who succeed in meeting their target to accept more funds at
the same rate of equity as originally offered. This particular feature is proving popular with roughly
61.3% of companies.
In this paper we analyse 636 equity crowdfunding campaigns, encompassing 17,188 investors (also
called “backers”) and 64,831 investments (often termed “pledges”) between 2012 and 2015. We
provide descriptive statistics and carry out various regression exercises to analyse which factors are
associated with the probability of a successful equity crowdfunding campaign. Such analysis has
been performed before (e.g. Mollick, 2014), but mostly on rewards-based campaigns.2 The latter
focus has been driven mainly because it is relatively easy to collect and analyse data from sites such
as Kickstarter and Indigogo (see Agrawal et al (2011, 2014), Belleflamme et al (2014), Mollick (2014),
Zhang and Liu (2012) to name a few), and because as discussed above, regulation in the U.S. for
equity based crowdfunding has, until very recently, been lacking.
Making some cautious predictions about the nature of crowdfunding across the four different
categories, Mollick (2014) states: “…to some degree, all crowdfunding funders may be thought of as
investors, making decisions about which projects to support based on their expectations for
success... Further …the dynamics of crowdfunding may be stable across some contexts. (p. 4).” In
this paper we provide contrasting information to Mollick’s data from Kickstarter to address these
predictions in a way not possible before.
We find that equity crowdfunding differs from the typical rewards-based crowdfunding in a number
of important respects: a) a much higher average amount pledged; b) a much higher average
campaign goal, steadily increasing over time and lately approaching the size of first round
investments for VCs; c) the existence of (pre-money) valuation of each of the projects, and d) the
clear goal of the backers to obtain a positive monetary return on their investment. In terms of the
geographical distribution, we find that the largest share of the investors using the platform are
located in the London area. There is however also considerable geographical dispersion of backers
across the country, suggesting that equity crowdfunding could plausibly mitigate the effect that
distance has on traditional fundraising efforts (see, for example, Agrawal (2011)). The data from
SEEDRS, while limited to one platform, albeit a very important European one, suggests that equity
2 In the recent literature review by Belleflamme et al (2015) we found 13 references to papers on rewards-
based crowdfunding, 12 papers on lending, 3 on donations, and finally 2 on equity crowdfunding.
crowdfunding will become a significant phenomenon for early stage fundraising in the U.S. in years
to come, potentially surpassing rewards-based crowdfunding.
We further discover that the dynamics of a campaign and in particular the kind of herding behaviour
observed in the early stages of a campaign do seem to be similar in both equity and rewards-based
crowdfunding. After we present the data and analysis, we provide a more detailed discussion of the
similarities and differences between the different types of crowdfunding.2. Data Description and Variables
The data used for the analysis comes from the equity crowdfunding platform SEEDRS. The
information was made available directly from their CTO and comprises the full universe of
campaigns from the launch of the platform in July 2012 up until September 2015. In total, there are
636 campaigns, 17,188 investors and 64,831 pledges.
For each project, the raw data contains information about the date the campaign started raising
funds, the declared investment target, the pre-money valuation of the company, the number of
entrepreneurs, and the timing and value of each of the pledges received while the campaign was
running. Each pledge is also matched to a specific investor with a unique identifier, so we are able to
analyse the behaviour of both individual campaigns and individual investors. The key variables of
interest at the campaign level are summarized in Table 1, where the variables are defined in Table 2.3. Results
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 provide a first glimpse into the characteristics of the
projects aiming to raise capital using SEEDRS. Out of the 636 campaigns for which information is
available, 216 (33.9%) ended up being successful in raising the declared investment goal. We divide
the summary statistics for the variables used for the analysis into three groups, corresponding to the
overall mean across all campaigns, and the averages within the group of successful and unsuccessful
campaigns separately.
The average campaign goal was £138,228, but there is a large heterogeneity in the amounts asked
by individual projects, with values that range from £2,500 to more than £1,000,000. Moreover, the
amount of capital sought by individual campaigns has grown considerably as SEEDRS has
consolidated since their beginning in 2012. During the first year of operation, the average desired
investment was close to £68,000, but this number was more than £200,000 during the last 12
months for which data is available (see Figure 1). This desired investment corresponds to an average
equity offered (in pre-money valuation terms) of about 12.6%. The level of the investment target
and pre-money valuations of the campaigns in SEEDRS present a first sharp contrast with other non-
equity crowdfunding schemes. For example, Mollick (2014), in a study of more than 48,500 projects
raising funds in Kickstarter, shows that the average goal is less than 10,000 USD, much lower than
what is observed in our sample.
Although there are substantial differences in the scale of the campaigns between equity and non-
equity crowdfunding platforms, we do find that the some of the dynamics of investment behaviour
are consistent with what has been found in other studies of non-equity crowdfunding (see, for
example, Agrawal et al., 2011; Agrawal et al., 2014; Mollick, 2014): We find that funding is highly
skewed, with successful campaigns receiving almost all of the total amount pledged each month (see
Figure 2). Campaigns that fail to raise the desired capital tend to do so by a large margin, while most
successful campaigns overfund, going up to 138 percent of the target.
Also consistent with previous analysis of non-equity crowdfunding platforms is the importance of
early investments in determining the chance that a campaign has of reaching the goal. Successful
campaigns accumulate, on average, 17.5% of the total amount at the end of the first day, and this
number increases to 51.2% after the first week. Failed campaigns, on the other hand, never really
get started. Halfway through the time limit these projects have only covered about 11.1% of the
total. This pattern is better illustrated in Figure 3, where we plot the timing it takes for campaigns to
reach a given share of the target within the first 30 of a maximum allowed 60 day campaign period.
The Figure is divided in 4 parts, each corresponding to a different distributional statistic (10th, 50th,
90th percentiles, and the mean). It is clear that even the most successful group within failed
campaigns barley managed to raise half of the desired capital by day 30.
The ability of successful campaigns to attract a large number of investors contrasts with the lack of
supporters for campaigns that end up failing the mark (see Figure 4). Successful campaigns have an
average of 158 backers, more than five times the average number of investors in failed campaigns.
The difference is not limited to the number of investors. The typical contribution made by each
backer is larger for successful campaigns, with a median pledge of £368 compared to £233 for failed
campaigns. Average individual contributions have also increased substantially in time. The average
pledge in 2012 was £400, while in the first 7 months of 2015 the same number is close £1,400 (see
Figure 5).
Moreover, a few large investments appear to have a major role in driving the success. The largest
pledge in a successful campaign accounts for about 30% of the total investment sought, which is
significantly larger than the 5.4% contribution of the highest pledge in an unsuccessful project. Large
pledges can be important in two ways: by contributing to the accumulated capital stock of the
campaign, and by their indirect effect in incentivizing other backers into investing in a particular
project. Each individual campaign raising capital through SEEDRS provides information about both
the cumulative amount of funds raised up to that point in time and their top investors in terms of
the value of the pledges3. Having backers willing to invest large sums in a campaign can act as a
positive signal to undecided investors about the potential quality of a project, and this indirect effect
is more relevant in the context of high uncertainty that is intrinsic to crowdfunding markets.
In terms of the characteristics of the supporters of the campaigns, about half of the investors making
a pledge to a project decide not to allow their profiles to be seen by others. Investor profiles vary in
their information content, but they include their geographic location, previous investments in other
campaigns, and, on some occasions, social media contacts or short biographic descriptions. The lack
of information about who is supporting a project can add to the uncertainty, but it appears to make
3 Each campaign reports all the pledges made to the project, but investments are organized by their
magnitude, so that top pledges are shown first in the campaign’s page.
little difference in determining the probability of success4. Apart from this, projects that end up
reaching the target do tend to attract investors with a better success history within the platform, as
well as those that have invested high amounts in previous projects.
In each calendar month, about 8.5% percent of the running campaigns reach their target, but the
success rate has doubled in time from 5% in the first year of operation of SEEDRS to more than 11
percent in the last 12 months (see Figure 6). In order to get a better sense of the relative importance
of different campaign characteristics for the probability of success, we estimate a linear probability
model5 using the dichotomous success indicator as a dependent variable, and the campaign
characteristics as covariates. Results of the regression exercise are shown in Table 3. The four factors
that have the strongest effect on the probability of success are: (1) the share accumulated in the first
week of the campaign6; (2) the investment goal set by the promoters; (3) the largest amount
pledged by a single backer; and (4) the number of backers in the campaign. An increase of one
standard deviation in any of these indicators increases (or decreases in the case of the investment
target) the probability of success by between 11 and 18 percentage points. Given a baseline success
share of 33.9%, these results suggest that the dynamics of any of these four variables is crucial for
the end result of the campaign.
It is not easy to disentangle the underlying mechanism driving these reduced form results. For
example, it is likely that a good start of a campaign can be interpreted by other backers as a positive
signal about the unobserved underlying quality of the project, driving other investors into the
campaign. This herd type of behaviour has been extensively analysed in theoretical models and
empirical work on financial markets (see, among others, Banerjee (1992), Welch (1992), Chari and
Kehoe (2004), Zhang and Liu (2012)), and can be important in a market with such large information
asymmetries as equity crowdfunding. A complementary explanation is that promoters that have
early success are those that put a larger effort into finding investors, even before the official start of
the campaign. SEEDRS explicitly advises promoters to do extensive pre-launch marketing, and allows
a campaign to have a web page with a private URL before the campaign goes public.
In any case, the type and quality of the information that investors can infer from the campaign, and
from the actions of other backers, is central to the story. As we discussed before, having individuals
willing to commit large sums of money can help a campaign by signalling to other investors about
the willingness to participate in a project. It is interesting that variables like the previous relative
success rate of the backers, and having investors in the campaign from the top 1% of overall
successful investors are both statistically significant, but of second order importance in driving
overall campaign success. Both of these variables might act as visible proxies of the type of backers
that the campaign is attracting, which in turn can trigger and reinforce positive dynamics. Their
impacts on herding behaviour might be better analysed within campaigns over time instead of
across campaigns.
4 Kim and Viswanathan (2014), studying an online crowdfunding market for mobile applications, find that the
identity of early investors, especially information about their previous experience, can positively influence the
subsequent behavior of other investors.
5 Results are unchanged if instead we fit a probit or logit model.
6 Results are robust to using other time spans in the regressions (e.g. percent covered in a day or in a month).
4. Discussion
In this paper we provide the first detailed study of equity crowdfunding in the UK. Equity
crowdfunding is an important and fast growing economic phenomenon. It has already had a
significant impact on early stage funding in the UK, and is likely to become an important avenue for
entrepreneurial finance in years to come in the U.S.
Our data shows that on one leading U.K. platform, significantly more and substantially larger
projects are funded via equity crowdfunding in 2015 than at the start in 2012. Overall market data
show less detail, but the same trends are visible there as well (e.g. Beauhurst, 2015). Our data show
that a large number of successful campaigns are overfunded – sometimes by more than twice the
amount originally requested. We find that, in order to succeed in reaching the project’s target on
time, it is particularly important to start strong, to have many backers, and especially to have (at
least) one backer who provides a large pledge.
Our findings are largely consistent with Agrawal et al.’s (2014) seven-point characterization of the
economics of crowdfunding (at least those that our data allow us to test), in particular the idea that
“funding propensity increases with accumulated capital and may lead to herding”. Our data
combined with the data collected by Beauhurst (2015) are also consistent with their suggestion that
crowdfunding will substitute traditional sources of financing.
Our paper's most immediate comparison is Mollick (2014), which studies the underlying dynamics of
rewards-based and patronage crowdfunding, using data from Kickstarter. We find that (a) the
average investment goal is substantially lower in Kickstarter: $9,866 U.S. dollars compared with
138,000 pounds sterling among SEEDRS projects; (b) the average pledge, in particular on the
successfully completed campaigns, is substantially greater on SEEDRS (1,370 pounds) than on
Kickstarter ($80); (c) Mollick found that funded projects achieve 1.5 times their goal on average,
which is very close to our figure of 138%; (d) unsuccessful campaigns fail by large margins on both
Kickstarter and SEEDRS; (e) projects on SEEDRS have a lower success rate compared with Kickstarter:
33.9 percent success rate on SEEDRS versus almost 50 percent in Kickstarter; (f) the average number
of backers per campaign is approximately the same, 67 on Kickstarter and 71 on SEEDRS, although
SEEDRS have somewhat more backers on the successful campaigns than Kickstarter and finally (g)
increasing goal size is negatively related with success probability on both platforms. Similarly to
Agrawal et al. (2011) and Mollick (2014), we find significant geographical dispersion among investors
using the SEEDRS platform in the UK (see Table 4). Close to 25 percent of both backers and pledges,
and 38.58 percent of the funds, originate in the London region. But the rest of investors and funds
are largely dispersed across the country, proving further evidence to the assertion that
crowdfunding platforms can overcome the distance related frictions that characterize venture
capital financing.
Although there are indeed some similarities across Kickstarter and SEEDRS as representatives of
prominent rewards-based and equity crowdfunding platforms, the differences observed
nevertheless lead us to conclude that equity crowdfunding is going to be a new and substantially
different fundraising phenomena than rewards-based crowdfunding. Equity crowdfunding has some
commonalities in data more similar to business angel and early stage venture capital than to rewards
based crowdfunding, in particular: the average size of the more recent campaigns; the presence of a
pre-money valuation; and the fact that there is an expressed equity sharing deal for each pledge.
Nevertheless, crowdfunding is distinctly different from both traditional forms of financing in that the
contracts are standardized and considerably simpler, the information provision is less, the number of
investors are much larger, and the fundraising process is much shorter. Given the increases in
efficiency of the fundraising process from the entrepreneurs’ perspective, it is not surprising that
equity crowdfunding has gathered such a momentum in recent years.
Herding is common in all types of crowdfunding. It is what we expect in a situation with so much
uncertainty: the decisions of the crowd provide some information in the absence of much else.
There have been a number of recent studies which use data from crowdfunding to specifically study
the dynamics of herding in these markets: Zhang and Liu (2012) who use P2P lending data and more
recently Kim et al (2015) who use rewards-based crowdfunding data.
In a companion paper (Astebro et al., 2015) we look in more detail at the question of herding. For a
given campaign we study the reaction of investors to high value pledges (over 1000 pounds) and the
rank ordering of the pledges on the platform. This allows us to separate rational from irrational
herding and test which is more persistent. More research on this topic is sorely needed.
Another line of research we are exploring with these data is overfunding. Entrepreneurs are clearly
under pressure to set a realistic target, one that they can achieve. But accepting additional monies is
expensive compared to closing the campaign at the goal and obtaining the same funds in the next
financing round, if they make it. In a future paper we build a simple model which captures this
dilemma and tests it against the SEEDRS data.
The data from the U.K. at large so far has not indicated spectacular lawsuits or other clear signs of
market failures, although detailed analysis of new microdata may conclude that additional
regulatory adjustments could still be warranted. For example, if irrational herding tendencies appear
too strong, regulators might consider tightening requirements for investor’s financial knowledge,
given the size and development of the sector. Regulators are keeping a keen eye on further
developments.
5. Conclusions
Equity crowdfunding is likely to be the subject of many research papers in finance and management
in the coming years, and rightly so given the amounts involved and the impact on early stage
financing. We hope this paper can provide the first useful evidence for researches working in this
space.
Tables and Figures.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Table 2: Definitions of Variables
Variable Definition
Successful
campaign
=1 if the campaign goal was met, zero otherwise. SEEDRS is an “all or nothing” platform in
which projects have up to 60 days to raise investment, so companies only receive funding if
they reach the declared investment goal within the time limit.
Pre-money
valuation:
The self-reported pre-money valuation of the project.
Equity Offered Percentage of equity that the campaign managers are offering.
Campaign goal Declared desired investment by the campaign promoters.
% Raised Total amount raised by the campaign divided by the campaign goal. SEEDRS allows
campaign promoters to accept more capital than what they had originally asked for, so they
can “overfund” the projects once the target is reached. In cases in which there is
overfunding, the variable takes a value that is greater than 100 percent.
# Entrepreneur Number of entrepreneurs in charge of the project.
EIS tax relief =1 if investors in the campaign have access to the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) tax
relief, zero otherwise.
SEIS tax relief =1 if investors in the campaign have access to the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme
(SEIS) tax relief, zero otherwise.
# Backers Number of different investors that have made pledges to the campaign.
# Pledges Number of different pledges made to the campaign.
Share of public
pledges
Investors can choose to share their SEEDRS' profile with other members of the platform.
Each profile includes information about the investor location, the amount they have
invested in different projects within the platform, campaigns in which they are promoters,
and, occasionally, social media contacts or short biographic descriptions. Each pledge made
is recorded in the campaign’s page in order of magnitude, and investors are asked if they
want their profiles to be seen next to the value of the investment. The variable is then
constructed as the ratio between investments that are public, that is, investments in which
the backer profile is available to the public, and total investments made in a given
campaign.
Backer success
share
For each investor making a pledge in a project, we calculate the ratio between previous
successful campaigns in which the backer has invested and the total number of previous
campaigns (successful or not) in which he or she made pledges. In cases in which the
investor has not made pledges in previous projects the ratio takes the value of zero. The
variable is then constructed as the average success share across all backers in the campaign.
Backer in top
1%
Before the start date of each campaign, we rank investors into percentiles according to the
average value of the pledges they have made in all previous successful campaigns. If an
investor that is ranked in the top 1% makes a pledge in the campaign, the variable takes a
value of one, if not, the variable takes a value of zero.
Pledges Average value in pounds of the pledges made to the campaign.
Pledges/goal Average campaign pledge in pounds divided by the campaign goal.
Max pledge Maximum single pledge made in each campaign.
Max pledge /
goal
Maximum single pledge made divided by campaign goal.
Self-
investment
=1 if the project promoters made an investment to the project, zero otherwise.
% Covered X The share of the campaign goal that was raised during a given period (X) of time.
Table 3: Probability of success. Linear Probability Model
Table 4: Geographical distribution of backers
Figure 1: Mean campaign goal for new campaigns
Notes: Series correspond to a 3-month moving average.
Figure 2: Total amount pledged per month
Notes: Series correspond to a 3-month moving average.
Figure 3: Timing of Cumulative Investments
Figure 4: Backers per campaign by calendar month
Notes: Series correspond to a 3-month moving average.
Figure 5: Mean amount pledged per month
Notes: Series correspond to a 3-month moving average.
Figure 6: Percentage of campaigns that reach the goal each month
Notes: Series correspond to a 3-month moving average.
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